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Introduction 
 
On July 27, 2006, the Georgia House of Representatives’ Tax Reform 
Committee held a session on the topic of tax “collectibility.”  This policy brief 
provides an elaboration of the presentation that the Fiscal Research Center made at 
that session.    
We consider three questions:   
● How large is the tax gap? 
 
● Why does the tax gap exist? i.e., why do people pay (or don’t pay) taxes? 
 
● What can be done to reduce the tax gap? i.e., what actions might be taken 
to improve collections? 
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How Large is the Tax Gap? 
 
The “tax gap” refers to the difference between the tax revenue that would be 
collected if there was full compliance (i.e., the tax liability) and the actual tax 
collections.  In other words, the tax gap is the amount of tax revenue that is not 
collected because of a lack of compliance.   
We are interested in the size of the tax gap because it is a measure of the size 
of the compliance problem.  If the tax gap is small, then there should be less concern 
regarding compliance, and thus less effort devoted to trying to improve compliance.  
On the other hand, a large tax gap should be a cause for concern.  It should be noted, 
however, that a small tax gap is in part due to the strength of the tax administration, 
so a small tax gap is not a signal to reduce compliance-related tax administration.   
Unfortunately, there has not been a study of the tax gap for Georgia.  Despite 
this lack of a study for Georgia, we present some information regarding the possible 
size of the tax gap.  We consider each of the three major taxes: sales and use tax, 
income tax, and property tax. 
 
Sales and Use Tax 
Two states, Minnesota and Washington, have conducted studies of the tax gap 
for their sales and use tax.  The two studies take different approaches, with 
Minnesota’s study being the more comprehensive.   
Minnesota’s study is based on audits and measures of overall economic 
activity in the state.1  This information is used to estimate how much sales and use tax 
the state should be collecting.  The analysis includes tax revenue that is lost from 
sources that are generally not revealed in audits.  For example, use taxes that are 
owed by individuals on purchases from remote vendors are normally not collected, 
nor are such purchases identified in audits.   
The Minnesota study estimates that the tax gap in 2000 was $451 million.  
This amounts to about 12 percent of actual sales and use tax collections.  The study 
                                                          
1 “Minnesota Sales and Use Tax Gap Project: Final Report” American Economics Group, Inc, 
November 19, 2002.   
Tax Collectibility and Tax Compliance 
in Georgia 
 
 
 3
finds that of this amount, $288.1, or 63.9 percent, is from underreporting and $163.0 
million (36.1 percent) is from non-reporting.  The study projects a tax gap for 2007 of 
$693.1, an annual increase of 6.3 percent.  
The state of Washington’s tax gap study includes not only sales and use taxes, 
but excise taxes such as tobacco taxes as well.2  The Washington study is based only 
on audit information, so unlike the Minnesota study it does not include estimates for 
tax revenue from economic activity that would not be identified by an audit.  Thus, it 
is expected that the Washington study will uncover less of the uncollected taxes than 
the Minnesota study.  
The Washington study finds that in 2000, the tax gap was $182.6 million, or 
2.2 percent of tax liability.  This is a much smaller tax gap than estimated in the 
Minnesota study, and is due, at least in part, to the narrower approach to the 
estimation.  The estimated tax gap is also slightly smaller than the Washington 
estimate.   
The Washington study found that there was a higher rate of noncompliance 
among newer and smaller firms.  For firms that have been in business two years or 
less, the noncompliance rate was estimated to be 6.7 percent, compared to 1.5 percent 
for other firms.  For firms with gross income between $100,000 and $500,000, the 
noncompliance rate was 9.1 percent.   
These two studies provide some benchmark for the possible compliance 
problem for Georgia.  However, without a Georgia study, it is not possible to 
determine whether the sales and use tax gap in Georgia is closer to 2 percent or 12 
percent, or the smaller or the larger than these two estimates.   
 
Income Tax 
The Internal Revenue Service conducts an extensive tax gap study for Federal 
taxes, including personal income tax, corporate income tax, and payroll taxes (e.g., 
the Social Security tax).  The IRS updates its tax gap estimates regularly, although 
the lag is substantial.  The most recent IRS tax gap estimate was released in February 
                                                          
2 “Department of Revenue Compliance Study” Research Report #2004-4, December 20, 2004, 
Washington Department of Revenue. 
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2006, but is for the tax gap in Tax Year 2001.  The tax gap is estimated based on a 
random sample of about 46,000 tax returns, which are audited in great detail. 
The IRS tax gap is an estimate of the difference between what taxpayers 
should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis.  The IRS estimates 
that the overall gross tax gap for Tax Year 2001 comes to $345 billion, or 16.3 
percent of tax liability.  This gap is comprised of non-reporting ($27 billion), 
underreporting ($285 billion), and underpayment ($33 billion).  IRS enforcement 
activities, coupled with other late payments, recover about $55 billion of the tax gap, 
leaving a net tax gap of $290 billion for Tax Year 2001.   
Federal compliance rates are much higher when there is a substantial third 
party reporting and withholding (98.6 percent compliance rate) than when there is 
little or no information reporting (46.1 percent compliance rate).   
Of the $285 billion in underreporting, $197 billion is from the personal 
income tax, $30 billion from the corporate income tax, and the rest from other taxes.  
The overall underreporting gap for the personal income tax is 18 percent. 
Table 1 shows the net misreporting rate by various tax items for the personal 
income tax.  As can be seen, compliance is highest for wages, since that source is 
subject to withholding, while business income has a much lower compliance rate.   
Georgia relies on the Federal adjusted gross income as the basis for its 
income taxes.  Thus, any tax gap at the Federal level is likely to be realized at the 
state level.  Thus, we would expect that the personal income tax gap is at least 18 
percent in Georgia, if the Federal non-reporting is similar over all states. 
But it is also possible that individuals file and report income at the Federal 
level, but fail to do the same at the state level.  We compared Georgia personal 
income tax returns for resident filers to Federal personal income tax returns for 
Georgia residents.  We find that approximately $3 billion of Federal adjusted gross 
income that is reported for Federal personal income tax purposes does not appear to 
be reported for Georgia income tax purposes.  We also find that there are about 7 
percent fewer Georgia resident state income tax returns than Georgia resident Federal 
tax  returns.  Because  Georgia’s  filing  threshold is relatively low, we do not believe 
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TABLE 1.  INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX UNDERREPORTING GAP ESTIMATES, TAX YEAR 
2001 
Type of Income or Offset Tax Gap ($B) NMP† 
Total Underreporting Gap  197 18% 
Underreported Income 166 11% 
Non-Business Income 56 4% 
    Wages, Salaries, Tips 10 1% 
    Interest Income 2 4% 
    Dividend Income 1 4% 
    State Income Tax Refunds 1 12% 
    Alimony Income * 7% 
    Pensions & Annuities 4 4% 
    Unemployment Compensation * 11% 
    Social Security Benefits 1 6% 
     Capital Gains 11 12% 
    Form 4797 Income 3 64% 
    Other Income 23 64% 
Business Income 109 43% 
    Nonfarm Proprietor Income 68 57% 
    Farm Income 6 72% 
    Rents & Royalties 13 51% 
    Partnership, S-Corp, Estate &  
    Trust, etc. 
22 18% 
Overreported Offsets to Income 15 4% 
Adjustments -3 -21% 
    SE Tax Deduction -4 -51% 
    All Other Adjustments 1 6% 
Deductions 14 5% 
Exemptions 4 5% 
Credits 17 26% 
Net Math Errors (non-EITC) *  
†NMP = Net Misreporting Percentage.  *Less than $0.5 billion. 
 
that much of this loss is due to individuals who file the Federal return but are not 
required to file Georgia’s return. 
While these are rough, “back of the envelope” calculations, they do signal the 
possibility that there is substantial income reported on Federal returns that is not 
being reported for Georgia personal income tax purposes.  Given our analysis, the 
Georgia Department of Revenue analyzed their 2004 returns, and categorized 
differences between Federal and Georgia reporting by reasons for non-filing.  For 
2004, the Department reports that 97.17 percent of Federal returns were also filed in 
Georgia.  The difference is 111,684 returns, or 2.83 percent of the Federal returns 
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filed for 2004.  Of this, a number were legal non-filers (due to part-year residents 
with no tax liability or Georgia residents with zero tax liability).  A total of 42,278 (or 
1.07 percent of all Federal returns filed with Georgia identified as state of residence) 
were identified by the Department of Revenue for further investigation.  If the level 
and distribution of non-filers were approximately the same in 2002 and 2004, this 
suggests that about 1/3 of the tax returns that we identify as potential non-filers in 
2002 would be classified for further investigation by the Department of Revenue. 
 
Property Tax  
We know of no study of the tax gap for property taxes.  However, we also 
know that the collection of tax liability is very high.  Generally 94 percent to 98 
percent of the property tax levy is collected on time; probably 99 percent or more is 
ultimately collected. 
There are two reasons for this.  First, the tax collector knows who owes the 
property tax.  Second, the tax collector has a very powerful enforcement tool since 
he/she can foreclose on the property if the owner does not pay the property tax. 
However, tax avoidance is still possible.  The taxation of much taxable 
personal property is based on a return filed by the business, which could under report 
such property.  The Wisconsin Department of Revenue audited several large firms 
with out-of-state headquarters, and found substantial under reporting of personal 
property.  Used aircraft sellers are known to fly their planes out of state in order to 
avoid paying the property tax on their inventory.  Owners register their cars in a 
jurisdiction that is not the true domicile of the car in order to face a lower property 
tax rate.  It is also possible that owners claim inappropriate homestead exemptions.  
For example, an owner may convert the house to a rental unit and continue to take the 
homestead exemption.  Also, someone might take homestead exemptions in more 
than one jurisdiction.  There is no evidence regarding how large this tax avoidance is. 
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Why Does the Tax Gap Exist? 
 
In very basic terms, there are three reasons why there is a tax gap: taxpayers 
make mistakes, taxpayers cheat, and there is poor tax administration.  The first part of 
the explanation for the tax gap is simply that people make errors (unintentionally) in 
their bookkeeping, and that they also make errors because they do fully understand 
the tax law. 
A second part, probably the major part, is that people cheat on their taxes.  
Some individuals or firms simply do not file tax returns.  Many of those who do file 
misreport various items, either underreporting income or sales, or overreporting 
expenses and deductions.  There are also instances where firms who withhold income 
or payroll taxes, or who collect sales and excise taxes, do not remit these taxes to the 
authorities. 
Third, underlying all of this is poor tax administration – few audits, tax 
auditing systems that are outdated, under-funded, and poorly targeted, even 
corruption and malfeasance in the tax administration. 
To focus more on some different aspects of these three basic reasons, we 
discuss some recent research evidence that addresses the basic question: why do 
people pay taxes (and, thus, why do people not pay taxes)?  This research has been 
conducted by economists, other social scientists, and tax administrators, working in 
the United States and in many other countries around the world. 
A standard – and obvious – conclusion from the economic analysis of the tax 
gap is that enforcement of the tax law is a central factor in peoples’ decisions to pay 
taxes.  This means that fear of detection is a powerful incentive for people to pay 
their taxes: if people are afraid that their cheating will be detected in an audit, then 
they are more likely to pay their taxes – and so the tax gap will be smaller.  The 
evidence is that an increase in the audit rate (i.e., the percent of returns that are 
subjected to an audit) of, say, 10 percent will increase reported income by 1 to 2 
percent. 
There are other ways to increase the fear of detection besides increasing the 
audit rate.  These alternatives include: 
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● Audits can be more selectively targeted to those occupations and sectors 
where cheating has been found to be more prevalent; 
 
● Source-withholding – or the withholding of taxes at the point where 
income is earned – reduces the opportunities for cheating.  (In Section II 
it was noted that the compliance rate was much higher for income which 
was subject to withholding.) 
 
● Wider use of third-party sources of information can establish a “paper 
trail” or a “data warehouse” that makes it easier for the auditor to 
determine if a taxpayer fails to report a particular source of income (e.g., 
interest income); 
 
● Information-sharing between states, and between the states and the 
Federal government, can increase the probability that cheating will be 
detected. 
 
Related to enforcement is the penalty – or the punishment – that is imposed 
on any cheating that is detected.  Without a penalty, audits would provide little 
incentive to not cheat.  Most monetary or financial penalties are small (typically back 
taxes plus an interest penalty), unless fraud is proven. Even so, there is evidence that 
larger penalties encourage more reporting (e.g., an increase of 10 percent in the 
effective penalty rate increases reported income by about 1 percent).  There are also 
ways in which punishment can be imposed other than through financial penalties. 
Sending cheaters to prison (think of Leona Helmsley) and even making the names of 
cheaters publicly known are also forms of punishment.  A particularly creative 
example comes from a city in India, which recently sent drummers to the homes of 
people who had not paid their property taxes.  The drummers stood outside the homes 
beating the drums around the clock until the delinquent taxes were paid. 
Linking in the taxpayer’s mind the taxes paid with government services 
received has been shown by researchers to increase peoples’ willingness to pay taxes; 
that is, no one likes paying taxes but everyone likes receiving quality government 
services.  Thus, getting the taxpayer to make more clearly this connection will reduce 
the tax gap.  There is also evidence that people pay more taxes the more they feel that 
government is responsive in providing what they value.  There is even some evidence 
that suggests that positive rewards to individuals found to be honest, via such things 
as lotteries for passing an audit, encourages more compliance. 
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There is also some evidence from around the world (e.g., Singapore) that 
providing better taxpayer services encourages people to pay more taxes.  Here we 
mean that the tax administration makes it “easier” for individuals to pay their taxes.  
We will discuss this in more detail below. 
Related to making it easier for individuals to pay their taxes, there is growing 
evidence that a simpler and more stable tax code encourages increased compliance.  
Making the tax code simpler will also likely reduce errors that contribute to the tax 
gap. 
Finally, economists (with the help of psychologists) are recognizing that, 
although incentives matter in why people pay taxes, there are other, more 
psychological factors as well.  There is evidence from many countries of a “social 
norm” of compliance.  What is meant by this is a pattern of behavior that is judged in 
a similar way by others and that is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval.  
If others behave according to some socially accepted mode of behavior, then you will 
as well; if others do not so behave, then you won’t either.  This notion suggests that 
you will tend to comply as long as you believe that others are complying, but if 
cheating becomes the norm – if there is seen to be a widespread and socially 
acceptable “culture of evasion” – then you will cheat as well. 
This point is relevant to a tax amnesty in which tax cheaters are allowed to 
pay back taxes without penalty.  Such a program can send the signal that cheating is 
acceptable, and so can affect the social norm of compliance. 
Another psychological factor is that there is overwhelming evidence that 
individuals “overweight” the probability of being audited, acting as if the audit rate 
that they face is much higher than its true value.  This is something that works to the 
benefit of the tax administration. 
Among the other insights from recent research on why people pay taxes are 
the following: 
 
● A higher tax rate leads to less reporting (and more cheating), with an 
estimate that reported income falls by 0.5 percent to 3.0 percent for a one 
percent increase in the tax rate; 
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● It is easier to collect some taxes than others.  For example, collecting the 
use tax from individuals on items purchased over the internet is nearly 
impossible; 
 
● The average level of cheating is higher for returns prepared with paid 
assistance; 
 
● A one percent increase of income increases reported income from 0 to1.0 
percent, implying that higher income individuals report a smaller 
percentage of their income; 
 
● Women, the elderly, and married couples are less likely to cheat on their 
taxes. 
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What Can Be Done To Improve Compliance? 
 
The discussion in Section III suggested various actions that can be taken to 
improve compliance.  We expand here some on that discussion.   Methods to address 
the broad issue of tax compliance fall into several main categories: tax 
administration, tax services, tax culture, and tax structure.   
 
Tax Administration 
First, there is scope for an improvement in tax administration.  Traditionally, 
there are three main aspects of tax administration: taxpayer registration, taxpayer 
audit, and collections.  Improvements in each of these areas are feasible.   
 
● Increase taxpayer registration and identification via better use of third-
party information.  Tax administrators could use the following 
information: 
 
o Cross-reference between different taxes such as checking sales tax 
vendors against income tax returns;   
 
o Use of social security records, phone records, financial system data, 
and agency data bases such as driver’s licenses to identify potential 
non-filers; 
 
o Consistent use of IRS information. 
 
● Increase the number of audits.  This can be done either by hiring 
additional auditors or by contracting out audits to for-profit firms.  There 
is evidence that providing an additional $1 of audit resources to the IRS 
generates additional revenues of $3-$5.  Evidence for the Oregon 
Department of Revenue suggests additional revenue of $1 to $3 per 
additional dollar of audit resources; 
 
● Improve the quality of audits – and of the auditors.  The usefulness of the 
audit depends on the time devoted to the audit and the competence of the 
auditor.  Potential auditors are graduates of accounting program, and 
better students (auditors) have lots of opportunities to work in the private 
sector.  Thus, to get the better students, government has to pay a 
comparable salary; 
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● Increase penalties for tax cheating, such as the interest rate on unpaid 
taxes, and publicize tax evasion convictions as an alternative type of 
penalty; 
 
● Improve the effectiveness of audits via adoption of modern audit 
technology, including more systematic selection of returns for audit.  By 
developing and using a method of “scoring” tax returns in the hope of 
identifying likely tax cheaters, the return on the investment in audits can 
be increased;3   
 
● Follow up on taxpayers found to be noncompliant with the Federal 
personal income tax.  Certainly, if the IRS does an audit and finds 
underreporting, the state should follow up to determine whether the 
taxpayer also owes the state addition taxes.  The IRS and the Oregon 
Department of Revenue appear to have similar but nonetheless distinct 
audit strategies. Even so, there is evidence that Oregon could increase its 
collections by making better use of IRS audits per se.  But the state 
should do more than just piggy-back on IRS audits.  The state might do 
additional audits because the number done by the IRS is relatively small 
and because it appears that there are taxpayers who file Federal returns 
but who do not file state returns or file inaccurate state returns;  
 
● Apply non-harsh penalties often and consistently, facilitate payments 
through the banking system, allow for simple cross-tax deductions (e.g., 
interests payments on loans or mortgages), and rely more heavily on 
source-withholding; 
 
● Grant additional power for collecting delinquent accounts.  For example, 
in addition to imposing interest and fines for late reporting, the 
Department of Revenue could be given the power to revoke business 
licenses or driver’s licenses. 
 
In addition to these somewhat standard suggestions, the state might consider 
the following policies. 
 
● Disallow cash deductions unless the taxpayer identifies the person or firm 
that was paid.  The IRS already requires such information for charitable 
contributions; 
 
● Require increased information from selected taxpayers.  For example, as a 
form of simple audit, the state might request more detailed information 
                                                          
3 Scoring is a way of ranking taxpayers for audit purposes that uses various characteristics of the 
taxpayer such as sources of income and the magnitude of particular deductions, as well as a 
scheme for weighting these factors.  
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from certain taxpayers about sources of income or deductions, 
particularly regarding business income; 
 
● Allow 3rd party audits.  Ohio allows firms that have been identified for an 
audit to contract with a 3rd party to conduct the audit.  This is less 
disruptive for the firm and reduces the workload of the state audit staff.  
In addition, firms can voluntarily subject themselves to a 3rd party audit, 
and, in return, the state waives any penalty for underpayment of taxes. 
 
Taxpayer Services 
It is increasingly the case that reforms are not limited to these traditional 
enforcement mechanisms, which tend to emphasize the threats of detection and 
punishment.  Instead, tax administration may be changed by introducing policies that 
see the taxpayer more as a client in need of services.  This alternative approach 
emphasizes the provision of taxpayer services via such things as: 
 
● Promoting taxpayer education and developing taxpayer services to assist 
taxpayers in filing returns and paying taxes;  
 
● Simplifying taxes and the payment of taxes;  
 
● Simplifying tax forms and editing the instructions, recognizing that the 
education level of many taxpayers is very low; 
 
● Promoting voluntary compliance by lowering taxpayers’ costs associated 
with filing their taxes;  
 
● Improving phone service by expanding the hours of operation and 
reducing the time taxpayers have to spend on hold;  
 
● Using focus groups of taxpayers to improve the tax administration 
website, including the ability to ask questions via email; 
 
● Ensuring relative stability of the tax systems;  
 
● Promoting a taxpayer and a tax administrator “code of ethics.”   
 
The basic thrust of these “service paradigm” actions is to treat the taxpayer 
more as a client than as a potential criminal. 
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Change Tax Culture 
Government can take various actions that change the culture of paying taxes.  
Among the steps that might be considered are the following: 
 
● Use the mass media, or send personal letters, to reinforce tax compliance 
as the social norm – and publicize cheaters;   
 
● Emphasize the link between payment of taxes and the receipt of 
government services; 
 
● Target certain groups (e.g., new firms or employees) in order to introduce 
from the start the notion that paying taxes is the social norm; 
 
● Enlist other organizations such as retired teachers to promote compliance, 
so that it is seen (again) that paying taxes is the accepted pattern of 
behavior; 
 
● Avoid leading individuals to think cheating is “okay” – a tax amnesty is a 
classic example of sending the wrong signal, as is demonizing the tax 
code and tax collectors such as the IRS or the State Department of 
Revenue; 
 
● Address perceived tax inequities in the ways people feel that they are 
treated through the tax system.  If taxpayers think they are being treated 
unfairly, they are less inclined to respect the tax code and therefore less 
likely to comply. 
 
Tax Structure 
Finally, there is scope for changes in tax structure (e.g., rates and bases) that 
can encourage more compliance.  Lower marginal tax rates give incentives for greater 
tax compliance.  This would also require broader tax bases, and it is not known 
precisely how this aspect would affect compliance incentives. 
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Adequate Funding of Education in Georgia:  What Does It Mean, What Might It 
Cost, How Could It Be Implemented? (David L. Sjoquist and Abdullah Khan).  
This report contains a discussion of what adequate funding for education means and 
how it has been estimated for other states.  The report then explores the financial 
implications for Georgia of funding adequacy.  FRC Report/Brief 129 (May 2006) 
 
Legislative Influences on Performance-Based Budgeting Reform (Carolyn 
Bourdeaux).  Using data from several surveys of the states as well as a survey of 
Georgia state legislators, this report examines the role of legislators in the 
implementation of performance-based management and budgeting reforms.  FRC 
Report/Brief 128 (May 2006) 
 
A Georgia Fiscal History of the Past Forty Years (Richard Hawkins).  This report 
describes spending and revenue trends through four decades and relates the trends to 
the agendas of the state's governors.  It concludes with a list of challenges for this 
decade and beyond.  FRC Report/Brief 127 (April 2006) 
 
Gasoline Taxes in Georgia (William J. Smith).  This report describes and compares 
Georgia’s fuel tax with other states and evaluates it as a long-term dedicated revenue 
source for highway funding in the state.  FRC Report/Brief 126 (April 2006) 
  
A Historical Shift Share Analysis for  Georgia (Peter Bluestone). This report 
analyzes the trends in Georgia’s industrial composition and employment over the 
period 1970-2000 using shift share analysis.  FRC Report/Brief 125 (March 2006) 
Tax Collectibility and Tax Compliance 
in Georgia  
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The Demographics of Georgia III:  Lesbian and Gay Couples  (Gregory B. Lewis).  
Using 2000 Census data, this report compares the residential patterns, household 
incomes, house values, property taxes, and parenting patterns of Georgia’s same-sex 
and different-sex couples.  FRC Report/Brief 124  (March 2006) 
 
The Demographics of Georgia IV:  Hispanic Immigration Economic Policy Issues 
(Felix Rioja, Neven Valev, and Amanda Wilsker).  This report analyzes the 
economic policy issues in education, health care, the labor market, financial services 
and the fiscal impact arising from the large increase in Hispanic immigration in 
Georgia.  FRC Report/Brief 122 (March 2006) 
 
Georgia’s Taxes Per Capita and Per $1,000 of Income:  Comparisons and Trends 
(Peter Bluestone).  This report analyzes the trends in Georgia’s taxes per capita and 
taxes per $1,000 of personal income for the period 1981 – 2002.  FRC Report/Brief 
121 (February 2006) 
 
The Demographics of Georgia I:  Population in the State of Georgia: Trends and 
Projections to 2030 (Glenwood Ross).  This report explores trends in Georgia 
population dynamics and projects population growth to the year 2030. FRC 
Report/Brief 120 (February 2006) 
 
An Examination of Georgia’s Premium Tax. (Martin F. Grace). This brief 
analyzes the effects of changing the structure the insurance premium tax on tax 
revenues in Georgia.  FRC Brief 119 (February 2006) 
 
The Fair Tax and Its Effect on Georgia. (Laura Wheeler, Sally Wallace and 
Lakshmi Pandey). This brief analyzes the impacts of a national retail sales tax on 
Georgians.  FRC Brief 118 (December 2005) 
 
A Tax Limitation for Georgia? (David L. Sjoquist). This brief examines the need 
for a tax limitation in Georgia and the issues of design of tax or expenditure 
limitations.  FRC Brief 117 (December 2005) 
 
Georgia’s Aging Population:  What to Expect and How to Cope (Glenn Landers, 
Clare S. Richie, David Sjoquist, Sally Wallace, and Angelino Viceisza).  This 
report analyzes the impacts of Georgia’s aging population on state finances.  FRC 
Report/Brief 116 (December 2005) 
 
Potential Effect of Eliminating the State Corporate Income Tax on State Economic 
Activity (Laura Wheeler).  This report analyzes the effects to state employment and 
investment of eliminating the state corporate income tax.  FRC Report/Brief 115 
(October 2005) 
 
 
 
 (All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center 
at 404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737.) 
